The Anatomy of Incompetence

Been reading an old book, Norman Dixon's "Psychology of Military Incompetence" over the Easter break - I was told it it describes hierarchical incompetence rather than just military incompetence - ie any hierarchical structure where some people have to obey the commands of others is prone to this problem.

In Chapter 13 he lists 14 tendencies which in his view are the main contributing factors to incompetence. its interesting to look at some of the current examples - take for example the Olde Media's inability to see the new order emerging:

1. Serious wastage of human resources (lack of economy of force)

This normally manifests itself as deployment of staff in the wrong places due to a misguided view of where value is created, often due to old practices. I think the Peter Principle fits in here:

In a hierarchy, members are promoted so long as they work competently. Sooner or later they are promoted to a position at which they are no longer competent (their "level of incompetence"), and there they remain, being unable to earn further promotions. (This principle can be modeled and has theoretical validity) Peter's Corollary states that "in time, every post tends to be occupied by an employee who is incompetent to carry out his duties" and adds that "work is accomplished by those employees who have not yet reached their level of incompetence".

2. Fundamental conservatism, clinging to outworn tradition

I saw this at its worst when doing a piece of consulting work with a dyed-in-the wool insurance company with shoe leather (travelling salesmen) all over the country, as telephone insurance was rising. The top management was employing every trick in the book to persuade itself that the staus quo remained in situ

3. Ignore or reject information which is unpalatable

See above.....

4. Underestimate enemy/overestimate own capabilities

I watched this first hand with large corporates and their advisors laughing at the internet and the dotcoms, and in 90% of cases they were right. But what a change the other 10% made.

5. Indecisiveness

This (in my view) is what happens in second stage incompetence, ie when it has become clear that the world is not working out as planned, but the decision makers either (i) have no mental models to conceive of what an answer may look like or/and (ii) are unwilling to make the painful structural changes required as it usually means destroying their own support networks

6. Obstinate persistence in a given task despite strong contrary evidence

"The definition of stupidity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." — Albert Einstein. Nuff said.....

7. Failure to exploit situations gained

Typically because the situation gained is not recommended. I started my working life ina hardware manufacturer that made better UNIX gear than Sun, but over 3 years lots its lead as it's internal logic made it keep on paddling upstream to promote the minicomputer market (See point 3 above) and ten got into a funk when that failed (point 5)

8. Failure to make adequate reconnaissance

The number of companies that barge into a market without doing adequate testing or research is truly breathtaking, even today.

9. Predilection for frontal assaults (against enemy's strongest point)

Doing the obvious - trying to "me too" everything

10. A belief in brute force

In companies this is pretty much the belief that "more of teh same" will work even as the market changes.

11. Failure to make use of surprise

The corollary of the above

12. Undue readiness to find scapegoats

I.e. politically poisonous company cultures are probably a sign of major problems

13. Suppression or distortion of news from the front

The classic problem - look at any company's pronouncements for signs of company propaganda that don't reflect reality and you have a measure of its likely demise. Start with the mission statement.

14. A belief in mystical forces (fate, bad luck etc)

Can't comment on this, but beware the CEO who plays with his balls....

Sadly he doesn't pull out any as more important than any other, but I'd pretty much go on his his 1-14 list as being in descending order of magnitude in my experience.

There are a number of other useful points made:

On the training of the Officer class

There was a fascinating discussion of the findings of the British army in 1901, which was that few officers showed any capacity for command, there was too much drill and cramming for marks, and the lecturers wre selected for prowess at the showy aspects - games and smartness in this case - rather than knowing the subject. They go further and also point out if all senior officers come from one social class and educational route then you get a worrying amount of groupthink. Now, with a few adjustments one could probably make very similar comments today for the MBA degree, the current "officer training" for business life.

Cognitive Dissonance

This occurs where someone possesses knowledge or beliefs which differ from the actual situation they observe and a decision they make. The result is that once a person makes a decision to act in a certain way, their mindset changes and they become more partial to that decision and biassed against other options, and seek to justify the original decision - the more vigorously the less justified it is.

People are not naturally made for Hierarchies - and the problem of brains

Much of the behaviour in a hierarchy is not instinctive, so rules, rewards and punishments have to be designed to keep people operant in the hierarchy. Over time military hierarchies have had to put in more and more brains, which puts major strains on the structure (its no accident that military thought is now leading corporate in the use of small, multifunctional teams)

There is an interesting aside here that stable governments traditionally have ensured that their senior people are part of the ruling elite (failure to do ensures the military heads will promote themselves into the elite via coup etc). One can only be struck by the inability of the current US and UK governments to reform the banks that have now created net negative wealth that destroyed at least ten years of profits.

Macho Management

The book shows that "Anti-Effeminate" - ie Macho - military cultures have got in the way of executing orders (never mind making the right orders) countless times in examples of incompetence, and that the really great Generals were by and large not "macho" by the standards of their day. One of the biggest problems with "Macho" cultures is that they self select for Macho attributes rather than those that are relevant to the task so over time organisational incompetence grows.

The book itself goes into many more detailed studies, including the purpose of military bullshit (reinforces the group separateness), anal types (a**ehole managers, as we'd call them), how authoritarianism drives towards incompetence etc

Authoritarianism

In fact the overall hypothesis is that Authoritarianism and its associated traits is the biggest driver of Incompetence. Partly this is because the Authoritarian nature of a hierarchy attracts the sort of people you may not wish to have in any leading position in it as they are by and large:

- more dishonest
- less likely to understand opponent's intentions/ see intentions that conflict with their views
- less willing to accept adaptation, innovation etc in response to change
- more likely to insist on blind obedience
- more likely to underestimate the opposition (and to use stereotypes)
- more prone to protect reputations and blame juniors, esp for their own shortcomings
- tend to be more obsessive
- tend not to value other people

(this last issue is taken to greater lengths in The Corporation),

The risk of Legacy

Another point they make is that the most effective armies at most points in history are those with the least past history, ie they have had to reinvent warfare in their time with a cold clear eye towards what is, rather than what used to be. In the last 100 years or so, South African Boer Commandos, Germany's between the wars adoption of armoured warfare tactics, the Israeli army of the 1960's and 70's. Of these the 2 most effective (in terms of ability to defeat far larger enemies) - the Boers and Israelis - had far less discipline and were far more "civilian" in nature than most of their contemporaries. He also notes that in the last 60 years or so, as technology becomes more complex, the independent brainpower of the average soldier has to rise, and thus unthinking hierarchical authority is less effective, forcing major changes in many armies today as they strive to operate independently at low level

Towards the end Dixon looks at exceptional commanders (competent and incompetent), and whether they were competent or fortunate, and what traits they had. Two interested me particularly:

Jackie Fisher, first lord of the Admiralty

He was heavily responsible for pulling the very conservative Royal Navy from a wooden ship sailing navy to a steel and steam navy, and pushing through the (in the day) radical design of the 1906 HMS Dreadnought that set the pattern for all major warships until the WW2 aircraft carrier. This is a task I see as akin to being a CEO of many more traditional companies today who have to pull their hidebound organisations through a period of radical technical - and thus strategic - change

T E Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)

Forced the hidebound WW1 British Army to use the guerilla tactics that had hurt it so badly in the Boer War on its enemies - in Palestine at least. To be fair, his superior commander, Allenby, is also seen as one of the better British generals of the 20th century (and by British WW1 standards a military genius of Alexander proportions). For a lower level entrepreneur like Lawrence you have to have people above you who will give you your head. No doubt there were Lawrences under Haig but they would have been stifled.

In both cases these men are seen to be non-authoritarian and non-obsessive, have wide interests outside of the military (ie are open to new ideas), were fascinated by the latest technology of their day, promoted their people mainly on the basis of efficiency and were liked by common soldiers and senior officers - but were also insistent in getting their way when they believed they were right.

In other words, if the Big Dogs in your company look like authoritarian, obsessive/anal, have narrow interests and are resistant to new ideas plus out of touch with modern technology, chances are they are incompetent and will drive their companies to ruin.

It also argues strongly towards more of a start-up, egalitarian, team-like organisation structures, which of course is what modern armies are trying to do. After all, it is well known that small companies create nearly all the new jobs and innovation these days. As Thomas Friedman noted today in his Op Ed (see previous link):

Good-paying jobs don’t come from bailouts. They come from start-ups. And where do start-ups come from? They come from smart, creative, inspired risk-takers.

There is a certain irony that advanced armies in 2010 are trying to turn themselves into the equivalent of the Boer armies of 1900.

It is doubly ironic that corporates, having taken their organisation structures from the military 200 years ago are now in many cases keeping to structures that the modern military is dropping.

So, what's your CEO like......?